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Introduction 
 In this thesis, it will be argued that the introduction of an unconditional basic income 
will have positive consequences in terms of people’s happiness. This is the conclusion 
following the central question: does an unconditional basic income have positive 
consequences in terms of people’s happiness? The thesis consists of six chapters. The first 
chapter introduces the concept of basic income, provides an overview of the current basic 
income debate and positions this thesis within the debate. The second chapter considers life-
satisfaction theories and a hedonistic approach before adopting Haybron’s (2008) emotional 
state theory of happiness. The third chapter shows, through the work of Haybron (2008) and 
Kasser (2002), that many people are unhappy because of two factors: the epistemic problem 
of happiness (we are unreliable at knowing what makes us happy) and a strong focus on 
materialistic goals. Chapter four explains how introducing a basic income would help to 
overcome some of the factors that contribute to the epistemic problem of happiness as well 
as provide an environment that makes us less likely to be focused on materialistic goals. 
Chapter five addresses two difficulties that might undermine the positive consequences for 
happiness: basic income might make people lonely and/or lazy. I argue that these two 
difficulties are not likely to undermine the positive consequences for happiness resulting 
from implementing basic income. The sixth chapter consists of a discussion of the 
implications for the basic income debate and implications for the happiness debate. 
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Chapter I  The basic income debate  
 A basic income is a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an 
individual basis, without a means test (the need to meet certain requirements for a benefit) 
or work requirement (BIEN, 2016). This includes pensioners (dependent on the country’s 
pensioners scheme), children (increasing with age until the full amount at the age of 18), 
inmates (costs of imprisonment deduced) and covers all residents that are also considered as 
residents for tax purposes. The general idea of a basic income that will be adopted in this 
thesis has five central characteristics (BIEN, 2016). A basic income is universal: it is paid to 
everybody. It is a cash payment and thus not in the form of services or vouchers. It is paid 
on an individual basis and not on household level. A basic income is periodic and is paid 
with regular intervals (e.g. weekly or monthly). The last and probably most controversial 
characteristic (Wallulis, 1997, p.187), is that the basic income would be unconditional: there 
is no requirement to become eligible, apart from being a member of the society (having a 
legal status for residing in the country, including temporary residents) (van Parijs, 1995, p. 
35).  
 The idea of providing an unconditional payment to all citizens is not entirely new. 
The following historical accounts are derived from the historical overview on the BIEN 
website (Birnbaum & Widerquist, 2016). One example of a previous similar idea came from 
Charles Fourier in earlier 19th century. Fourier (1836) argued that a minimum should be 
guaranteed for everybody. He reasoned this to be a requirement because he found it unjust 
that the poor could not benefit from natural resources because they were owned by the 
wealthy. Bertrand Russell proposed a guaranteed income in his work Proposed Roads to 
Freedom (1918), the idea was considered in the politics of the UK but got eventually 
rejected. More recently, during the 60’s and 70’s of the last century, basic income became a 
more widely discussed subject among European countries and the United States of America. 
There are several examples of experiments that provided a basic income to a village or 
community (e.g. in Alaska, Canada and Namibia). Currently, there is an ongoing experiment 
in Finland (McFarland, 2017a) and several soon to start experiments in the Netherlands 
(McFarland, 2017b).   
  Universal basic income is usually advocated for several reasons. A basic income is 
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said to readily reduce poverty, increase equality and reduce the likelihood of people 
becoming stuck in an unemployment trap. An unemployment trap means that a person is not 
motivated to find work because the received benefit from unemployment will be reduced or 
removed when a new job is found. This leaves the person with the same or similar income 
compared to the previous situation of not working and receiving full benefits. In other words, 
when being in an unemployment trap, there is no or hardly a monetary incentive to look for 
work. Also, it is argued that basic income greatly increases entrepreneurship, stimulates 
volunteer work, reduces stigma from receiving state benefits and makes people less 
dependent on the market for meeting their basic needs (van Parijs, 1995, 1998, 2006, 2013; 
Widerquist, 2011). Findings that are directly supported by empirical findings (from Alaska, 
Canada and Namibia) include: greatly increased entrepreneurship (Haarmann, 2009, p. 92), 
increase of available jobs (Goldsmith, 2010, p. 11), slight decrease in total work hours 
(though explained by an increase in maternity leaves and taking care of the family), increase 
in spending time on education, improved elementary school test scores, decreased diagnoses 
of mental health problems (Forget, 2011, p. 286, 299). increased creation of local markets 
(Frankman, 2010, p. 528), increase of productivity (through an increase in entrepreneurship), 
increased independence of women from men and an increase of income (excluding basic 
income) (Haarmann et al. 2009, p. 86, 93, 72).   
 One of the main arguments against the introduction of a basic income is that it would 
be too expensive. Paying all citizens an amount that covers basic needs would not be 
financially feasible (Henderson, 2015, p. 499). However, depending on the exact amount of 
a basic income and the countries’ specifics, a basic income is predicted as being financially 
feasible when abolishing the existing benefits and the controlling entity of these dividing 
these benefits while using progressive tax schemes (Torry, 2016, p. 96).  
Introducing a basic income could also cause people to become lazy (van der Veen, 
2000, p. 137) or lonely (Harris, 2016). I will turn to the specific arguments of laziness and 
loneliness in chapter V. Others argue that basic income would be unfair, as people who do 
not do anything receive resources while other people work hard to accumulate them 
(Torisky, 1993 p. 296). Van Parijs replies to this claim by claiming that somebody who 
spends all its days surfing might not deserve a basic income, but that the good luck the surfer 
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enjoys is not any different from the good fortune of people who currently benefit from the 
distribution of resources (van Parijs, 2001, p. 137), regardless of the taxes these people pay. 
The point here is that van Parijs argues for a liberal form of justice that does not discriminate 
between the different conceptions of the good life (van Parijs, 1991, p. 107). In this sense, 
the surfer enjoys good luck because her lifestyle is funded by basic income while she 
happens to not generate taxes. Van Parijs sees this as the same luck that rich people enjoy 
under the current scheme for the distribution of resources, even if these current rules do 
discriminate between different conceptions of the good life.     
  This thesis will specifically narrow its scope on the arguments that are concerned 
with happiness. Relevant positive aspects from basic income that could contribute to 
people’s happiness are considered, while also the most relevant counterarguments are 
considered. This thesis will not aim to formulate an argument concerning the fairness of 
basic income, neither the financial feasibility nor the feasibility of basic income in general. 
In other words, only some aspects of the basic income debate will be considered. 
Nonetheless, the findings might have consequences for the financial (feasibility) aspect of 
the basic income debate (chapter V). It will be argued that basic income alleviates the 
epistemic problem of happiness and decreases people’s focus on materialistic goals, two 
dynamics that undermine people’s happiness (chapter IV). So this thesis could be used as an 
additional argument for the proponents of basic income, as well as a potential contribution 
to the happiness literature and policy approaches concerning happiness (chapter VI). 
Specifically, there is good reason to believe that basic income will favour an environment 
where people are more likely to make more reliable decisions about their happiness. Thus, 
there is good reason to believe that basic income has positive consequences in terms of 
people’s happiness. Therefore, the thesis is of specific relevance in the discussion on whether 
basic income would make people happier. An additional contribution to this debate is the 
argument made in chapter V, which illustrates that the counterargument of laziness and 
loneliness from opponents of the basic income is not as strong as it is presented. In short, 
this thesis argues that basic income has positive consequences in terms of people’s 
happiness, an aspect of basic income that should be taken into account when considering 
implementing basic income. 
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Chapter II Adopting a framework for happiness  
Before explaining how basic income might entail positive consequences for  
people’s happiness, it will be necessary to adopt a plausible definition of happiness. The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes two philosophical directions on the study of 
happiness (Haybron, 2011). One direction takes happiness as an evaluative concept roughly 
equivalent to the concept of well-being, that is, a state that is by definition good for the 
person. The other direction takes happiness as a descriptive concept that describes a 
psychological state or condition, similar to describing “boredom” or “depression”, while 
leaving it open when and why happiness is good or contributes to the person’s well-being. 
This thesis concentrates on the latter psychological, descriptive notion of happiness. The 
reason for a focus on the psychological notion of happiness is that the identified problem 
underlying this thesis (next chapter) is concerned with the psychological constituents of 
happiness. An overview of the different happiness concepts is provided in the Annex.   
  Understanding happiness as a psychological condition is relatively new in the 
happiness literature. Current happiness research points to a gap in knowledge between the 
philosophy of happiness and more recent findings from positive psychology (Bishop, 2015, 
p. 2-5). This chapter will illustrate why two popular accounts of happiness are not sufficient 
in understanding happiness as well as present the account of happiness that is adopted in this 
thesis. This part of the argument draws on work by Haybron (2005, 2007, 2008), Bishop 
(2008), Hall (2014) as well as the Stanford Encyclopedia (Haybron, 2011). The latter is used 
because it provides an overview of the large amount of happiness literature. Haybron’s work 
is emphasised because it captures both historical accounts of happiness and more recent 
psychological findings in the study of happiness. Concluding this chapter, several criticisms 
of Haybron’s work are addressed.  
 
2.1 Life satisfaction  
 A life satisfaction account is often used interchangeably with the notion of happiness 
(Hall, 2014). The central aspect of life satisfaction theories is that they are concerned with 
the subject’s own overall assessment of their life. From the subject’s perspective, a long 
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passed feeling of happiness is less important than the currently perceived state of happiness 
(Haybron, 2011). Life satisfaction accounts focus on the subject’s perceived satisfaction, not 
on the objective quality or quantity of happiness. Another central element of life satisfaction 
accounts is the focus on priorities. Life satisfaction theories draw on what people put as their 
priorities rather than focusing on the aggregate of the different short-lived states of affect 
people express. By taking into account priorities of people, life satisfaction theories include 
longer periods of life, compared to only short-lived affective states. The reason is that these 
affective states might not reflect the priorities people have set in their life (Haybron, 2008, 
p. 66).  
  Life satisfaction theories have several disadvantages, some of which provide reasons 
to not adopt a life satisfaction framework for this thesis. One common criticism made against 
life satisfaction theories is that a subjective overall assessment of life might be very positive, 
even though the current affective state of that person resembles deep sadness. In other words, 
the person may not consider his sadness when assessing how satisfied he is with his life. But 
it seems counter-intuitive to assess a person that is in a state of deep sadness as happy.  
The problem lies partly in the fact that our personal assessment of our lives often 
depends on ethical norms that dictate what an appropriate attitude to life must be in a given 
situation (for example, a norm that tells us to discount sadness if we are wealthy, physically 
healthy, and socially successful) (ibid, p. 93). But these norms have arguably little to do with 
the descriptive question of whether one is, in fact, happy. Because of this personal reflection 
being subject to external, ethical norms, personal judgments of life satisfaction can hardly 
define a person’s happiness (ibid, p. 101). 
Life satisfaction theories could overcome this problem by framing the attitude 
someone has over her life as not only an attitude but as an emotional state as well. This 
would frame life satisfaction theories as describing “happiness as a broad, ongoing sense of 
well-being” (ibid, p. 87). The problem with this adaptation is that people usually do not have 
broader feelings of (dis)satisfaction with their lives (ibid, p. 87) and therefore, a life 
satisfaction theory would not capture the concept of happiness sufficiently. This bears 
specific importance for this thesis, because it will be illustrated that we are unreliable at 
knowing what make us happy. If we are unreliable at knowing what makes us happy, then 
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that would complement this criticism of life satisfaction theory that points out the 
discrepancy between assessing one’s overall quality of life and common intuitions about 
someone being happy. Another limitation of life-satisfaction theories is that assessments of 
a person’s life are subject to the current situation a person is in. For example, someone might 
evaluate her life worse in a situation with what she thinks is terrible weather than in a weather 
situation that she particularly likes (ibid, p. 87). Because of these criticisms and the specific 
importance for this thesis to adopt a theory that allows an objective assessment of one’s 
knowledge of happiness, a life satisfaction theory of happiness is not adopted in this thesis.
  
2.2 Hedonism 
  Another account of happiness that is considered for adoption in this thesis is an 
affect-based theory of the hedonist kind. A hedonist account of happiness assesses happiness 
as a function of positive and negative affects, i.e. of pleasures and displeasures (Haybron, 
2008, p. 45). The focus on our motivation to maximise pleasures is strength of the theory, 
because how pleasant our experiences are seems to usually reflect well how happy we are. 
Additionally, a hedonistic account seems to bear practical advantages, because assessing 
happiness could be reliably done by merely assessing the balance of pleasures over 
displeasures.   
 Criticism of a hedonistic account of happiness targets the simplistic aspect of 
focusing on pleasures and pains only. For example, some displeasures or pleasures might 
not affect happiness, because they do not affect the actual longer lasting state of the person, 
but rather remain limited to momentary psychological experiences only, or in other words: 
they simply do not reach “deeply” enough (Haybron, 2008, p. 63):  
 
 To be sure, we would expect someone who underwent an unrelenting succession of minor irritations  
 not to be very happy at the end of it all. But this does not show the irritations themselves to be  
 constitutive of one’s (un)happiness; it reflects rather our expectation that these experiences will  
 impact some deeper aspect of one’s psychology, such as one’s mood.  
 
Haybron explains that shallow pleasures or displeasures do not reach “deeply” enough (ibid, 
p. 63). A hedonist can argue that even a shallow pleasurable experience (e.g. eating a slice 
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of bread) might influence happiness. However, it seems to be false to state that shallow 
pleasurable experiences are always accompanied by an increase in happiness. There are 
pleasurable experiences that are irrelevant in the assessment of happiness: they simply do 
not influence happiness. Even in the case that eating a slice of bread does make you happier, 
there are shallow (dis)pleasurable events that do not reach deep enough to alter your 
happiness. For example, it is not the displeasurable experiences resulting from a depression 
that eventually make a person unhappy, but the deeper state of depression itself. Solely 
taking into account the balance of pleasant experiences over unpleasant experiences is 
perceived as insufficient to describe happiness, because it fails to reach the possible deeper, 
longer lasting emotional state that a person might be in (ibid, p. 63-64). 
This insufficiency is a reason to not adopt this theory for this thesis because of the 
two problems described in the upcoming chapter: a focus on materialistic goals negatively 
affecting happiness, and people being unreliable at knowing what makes us happy, are issues 
concerned with deeper, longer lasting emotional states (e.g. insecurity, stress) and will 
therefore not be captured by a hedonistic account of happiness. The reason for this is that 
states like insecurity, stress, and depression, arguably important contributors to unhappiness, 
cannot be reduced to just unpleasant experiences as required by hedonism. To understand 
happiness, it is required to acknowledge that unpleasant experiences are only a result of the 
deeper, longer lasting emotional states that contribute to unhappiness, as the next paragraph 
will address.  
 
2.3 Emotional state theory 
  The emotional state theory is also an affect-based theory, similar to a hedonistic 
account, and is developed and defended by Haybron. The emotional state theory of happiness 
differs from a hedonistic account because it is not limited to the type of affects that are 
identified with pleasures and displeasures, but includes other elements as well. The most 
important addition is that happiness is also concerned with deeper, longer-lasting 
psychological affective states that might not be directly expressed in shallower affective 
states (e.g. pleasures). These deeper states are what Haybron identifies as “central affective 
states” and refers to as: attunement, engagement and endorsement. Attunement is a state that 
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can be described as “feeling at home in one’s life” (Haybron, 2008, p. 112) and can be 
opposed to a defensive orientated stance. Engagement is concerned with a person’s 
commitment with the situation he or she is in or experiences. Boredom is a state that would 
oppose with engagement. Engagement is the central affective state that is partly derived from 
Aristotle’s notion of virtuous activity in his theory of well-being. The central state 
endorsement refers to is not only a sense that life can be lived without threats, but that there 
is actually something positive in life itself. Life does not only contain things that are worth 
pursuing but is good in a general sense. It inherently includes elements that are to be pursued 
or sustained. The joy that one would get from the pursuit of the American dream is an 
example of life itself to be perceived as inherently positive (Haybron, 2008, p. 113). In other 
words, it is the belief that living is joyful as such. Sadness is therefore something that can be 
seen as being opposed to a state of endorsement. These three central affective states can last 
over a longer period, possibly without being noticed. Haybron summarises his elaboration 
on the central affective states in the following sub-division, from the most to least important:
  
1. Attunement 
  a. Peace of mind vs. anxiety. 
  b. Confidence vs. insecurity. 
  c. Uncompression vs. compression. 
2. Engagement 
  a. Exuberance or vitality vs. listlessness. 
  b. Flow vs. boredom or ennui. 
3. Endorsement 
  a. Joy vs. sadness. 
b. Cheerfulness vs. irritability.  
 
(Haybron, 2008, p. 113)  
 
(Interestingly, it is the reverse order of importance that is, according to Haybron, generally 
recognised in common perceptions of happiness.) These central states are described as 
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“mood propensities”. They are conditions that dispose a person to experience certain affects 
more likely than others (ibid, p. 130). All three states have also their own negative 
counterparts, which can be referred to as “disendorsement,” “disengagement,” and 
“disattunement.” A general positive balance of all three states is important to be happy. 
While attunement and engagement are for Haybron more important, it does not mean that 
endorsement can be disregarded as a contribution. In general, to be happy means for Haybron 
the following: “To be happy, then, is for one’s emotional condition to be broadly positive—
involving stances of attunement, engagement, and endorsement—with negative central 
affective states and mood propensities only to a minor extent” (ibid, p. 147). Hence, this is 
also the description of happiness that is adopted in this thesis. Notice that this is not an exact 
definition of the word “happiness”, nevertheless, the description just given is as close as 
Haybron gets to a definition of happiness. He is particularly careful with an exact definition 
of happiness because, as he explains, “what matters is the thing, not the word” (ibid, p. 4). 
What he means is that people commonly refer to happiness in their own words and mean to 
describe the same thing.   
 The central states that Haybron describes are distinct from peripheral affective states. 
Peripheral states are shallow and consist of short-lived experiences (e.g. physical pain, 
amusement, annoyance). The peripheral states as such do not change the central affective 
states, nor do they influence happiness. Haybron seems to dodge criticism that is directed to 
hedonism (only taking into account short-lived states of affect) and life-satisfaction theories 
(limited by subjective biases in assessing life as a whole), by both making this distinction 
between central and peripheral affective states and framing the central affective states as a 
disposition to experience certain affective states. This has the result that the criticism that 
affects life satisfaction theories does not apply to the emotional state theory. Life satisfaction 
theories are affected by criticism that points out a discrepancy between the assessment of 
one’s overall life quality and the common intuition people have about someone being happy. 
The emotional state theory is not affected by this criticism because it claims that there are 
longer lasting central affective states that are not so easily recognisable. In other words, it is 
explained that people can be mistaken about their assessment of life because they generally 
do not have broader feelings of satisfaction about life.  
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Criticism that affects hedonistic theories is irrelevant, because the emotional state 
theory goes beyond the simplistic aspects that make hedonistic theories subject to criticism. 
Before adopting Haybron’s account of happiness, several points of criticism will be 
considered that might be troublesome for the line of reasoning in this thesis. 
  Haybron’s work is recent and is therefore less thoroughly critically assessed 
compared to older works. This paragraph provides a short overview of criticism on 
Haybron’s research. One of these critiques focuses on Haybron’s sharp distinction between 
central and peripheral affective states (Naar, 2012). In particular, Haybron explains how the 
central affective states are essential in contributing to happiness, while the shorter-lived 
peripheral affective states are claimed to not affect happiness at all. It is specifically the 
characteristic of short-lived peripheral states not, in any degree, affecting happiness that is 
the concern of Naar’s criticism. Why can short-lived shallow emotions such as being 
annoyed by dropping the house keys not affect how happy we are? What if we happen to be 
very clumsy and these small things make us annoyed all the time?  
Haybron does not provide an answer to this question and therefore lacks an 
argument to justify this sharp distinction. However, this insufficiency does not affect the 
line of reasoning in this thesis. The reason is that the problem that will be identified in the 
next chapter relies on empirical observation of components of the deeper central affective 
states, e.g. prevalence of anxiety disorder or depression rates, which are indeed more 
structural problems unlikely to be affected by short-lived experiences such as being 
annoyed by dropping house keys. Even if we assume that short-lived experiences, such as 
being annoyed by dropping house keys, is the result of structural clumsiness and does 
contribute to the higher depression rates observed, then the increase in these depression 
rates would, at most, only account for a small fraction of these depression rates, and 
therefore be insufficient as a counterargument.   
 Another criticism that is specifically important for this thesis is that maximising 
freedom through, in this case, providing an unconditional basic income, does not have 
positive consequences in terms of people's happiness. This will first require an additional 
explanation of a part of Haybron’s work: his critique of liberal optimism. In short, liberal 
optimism, according to Haybron, entails the “spirit of modernity” (Haybron, 2008, p. 12) 
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as in its essence, liberal optimism assumes that people know what is good for them and 
that people should therefore be empowered to govern their own happiness. In other words, 
they should be provided with maximal freedom because they themselves know best what 
makes them happy. Haybron provides a critique to the liberal optimism approach to 
happiness as it assumes that we know what makes us happy and therefore focuses on 
maximizing freedom (hence, in the next chapter Haybron’s work is used to illustrate that 
we are unreliable at knowing what makes us happy). Haybron attacks liberal optimism by 
explaining that we are actually not good at knowing what makes us happy and should not 
be trusted with extreme freedoms (ibid, p. 256-268). Haybron seems to be right with his 
claim that we are unreliable at knowing what makes us happy (chapter III), though he 
overlooks the possibility of how certain types of freedom (such as those granted by the 
introduction of a basic income) might make us better at knowing what makes us happy 
(chapter IV). The last chapter (VI) reconsiders Haybron’s criticism of liberal optimism in 
the light of the conclusions drawn in this thesis.   
  Conclusively, the emotional state theory is adopted in this thesis because of two 
reasons. The first is that it is a theory that seems superior to the two alternatives just 
discussed (life satisfaction and hedonism). In general, the emotional state theory provides a 
more objective and explanatory account of happiness compared to other theories. Second, 
as we will see in the next chapter, the emotional state theory can explain why there is a 
discrepancy between high rates of anxiety and depression (which do not seem to be 
compatible with a happy state) and self-reports of happiness. A life satisfaction account 
does not explain this discrepancy because depressed people can still assess themselves as 
happy even if they are not. A hedonist account does not explain the discrepancy because it 
only explains that there are many unpleasant experiences over pleasant experiences, not 
why people would assess themselves as happy while experiencing a depression. Moreover, 
as we will see, it helps to explain why people would choose a long and stressful experience 
in order to enjoy only a brief moment of happiness from a materialistic purchase. 
Answering why people are unhappy could provide the ground to explore if and how basic 
income might result in positive consequences in terms of people’s happiness.  
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Chapter III What makes us unhappy? 
  This chapter describes the problem that justifies the exploration of this thesis. The 
problem underlying this thesis is twofold: First, many people are unhappy because of a 
strong focus on materialistic goals. Hence, it will be illustrated that a strong focus on 
materialistic goals has negative consequences for the two most important components of the 
emotional state theory: attunement and engagement. Second, many people are unhappy 
because we are unreliable at knowing what makes us happy. The latter is what I will call the 
epistemic problem of happiness. Throughout the thesis, the reader might notice that the two 
problems are complementary to each other, though this is not something I will argue for. 
There might well be other factors that negatively affect our happiness. Nonetheless, I will 
illustrate that a strong focus on materialistic goals and the epistemic problem are crucial 
contributors to unhappiness. See figure below for an overview of the two problems and the 
central concepts. The figure does not intent to portray strict causal relations and is for 
illustrative purposes only.  
 
Figure 1. Overview of the two problems and the central concepts.  
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3.1 Materialistic goals 
Tim Kasser argues in his book The High Price of Materialism (2002, p. 5) how a 
strong focus on materialistic goals negatively affects our happiness. He does this by 
providing an overview of empirical psychological research. The essence of the dynamics 
that create a distraction from attaining happiness can be found in the following: 
 
 Although they [humanistic and existential psychologists] acknowledged the fact that some level of 
  material comfort is necessary to provide for humans’ basic physical needs, these psychologists   
  proposed that a focus on materialistic goals detracts from well-being and happiness. (text in   
 brackets added) (Kasser, 2002, p. 122)  
 
Kasser operationalises “materialism” in his research through an assessment of to what 
extent people have a focus on different aspects of materialistic values. These materialistic 
values are measured through a set of questions that test one's identification with, for 
example: financial aspirations, social status, possessions as well as a lack of identification 
with affiliation, lack of self-acceptance and lack of feelings towards contributing towards 
the community. In the empirical studies that Kasser uses to support his claims, people are 
assessed along a scale of to what extent they identify with these values. The empirical 
studies show that those people who identify themselves more with materialistic goals also 
report higher levels of depression and anxiety, as well as are undermined in meeting 
essential psychological needs such as safety and security, connectedness with others, and 
autonomous and authentically engaged behaviour. It is suggested that materialistic values 
are identified with as a result of a coping strategy, aimed to deal with an underlying 
insecurity. Attaining materialistic values works in this sense by momentarily increasing 
one’s self-esteem. Moreover, work and overtime needed to attain these values are 
encouraged as well, thus enhancing levels of stress and contributing to the previous 
mentioned negative effects. Additionally, materialistic values distract people from 
investing in relationships in communities, “weakening the fibres that bind couples, friends, 
families and communities” (ibid, p. 72). A compilation of the different research Kasser 
uses shows how materialistic values suppress or distract from attaining psychological 
needs central to happiness, as summarised in the following quote:   
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 Humanistic and existential psychologists tend to place qualities such as authentic self expression,  
 intimate relationships, and contribution to the community at the core of their notions of  
 psychological health. From their viewpoint, a strong focus on materialistic pursuits not only  
 distracts people from experiences conducive to psychological growth and health, but signals a  
 fundamental alienation from what is truly meaningful. (Italics added) (Kasser, 2002, p. 3) 
 
This quote does not frame a materialistic pursuit as a distraction directly from happiness, 
but does indicate how a materialistic pursuit distracts from seeking and valuing 
psychological experiences that contribute to the affective states central to happiness. More 
specifically, the high rates of depression and anxiety of people with a strong focus on 
materialistic goals closely relate to the two most important components of the emotional 
state theory described in the previous chapter. First, engagement seems to be negatively 
altered. In Haybron’s view, engagement covers an area close to “flow” in an emotional 
spectrum that goes from “flow” to “boredom” or “ennui”. Kasser explains that there are 
three ways how a strong focus on materialistic goals undermine intrinsic motivation and 
flow (Kasser, 2002, p. 77). First, people are led to pursue external rewards that are gained 
through experiences that are less likely to be chosen for the interest or challenge in the 
experience itself, and so such that draw one towards boredom rather than flow. Second, a 
materialistic focus makes people more aware of how others see them, and therefore more 
aware of themselves. But, as Haybron explains, a feature of the state of engagement is a 
kind of forgetting oneself in one’s activities. Third, the pleasant experiences gained from 
obtaining materialistic goals are less likely to contain the possibility to experience flow. 
Because of these three reasons, it seems plausible to say that a strong focus on materialistic 
goals undermines the experience of flow, and therefore an essential component of the 
engagement state.   
          Moreover, also attunement seems to be negatively affected. Attunement 
consists of three spectrums which are all negatively affected by a strong focus on 
materialistic goals. We will focus on the negative side of these spectrums. The negative 
counterpart of attunement is a state of disattunement or alienation: “your circumstances are 
in some sense alien to you—unfamiliar, imposing, threatening. Defenses go up: anxiety, 
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stress, insecurity” (Haybron, 2008, p. 116). The latter three defenses are simplifications of 
the three negative counterparts that define the state of disattunement. A strong focus on 
materialistic goals contributes to all three. First, as shown earlier, a strong focus on 
materialistic goals was related with significant higher levels of anxiety. Second, the 
relation with stress or a feeling of compression is best described in the following quote:  
 
  Desires to have more and more material goods drive us into an ever more frantic pace of life. Not   
  only must we work harder, but, once possessing the goods, we have to maintain, upgrade, replace,     
  insure, and constantly manage them. Thus, in the journey of life, materialists end up carrying an    
  ever-heavier load, one that expends the energy necessary for living, loving, and learning—the really   
  satisfying aspects of that journey. Thus materialism, although promising happiness, actually creates   
strain and stress. (Kasser, 2002, p. xi).   
 
The empirical research used by Kasser seems to confirm the above: people with a strong 
focus on materialistic goals experience higher levels of stress. Third, Kasser suggests how 
materialistic values can cause insecurity. People with a strong focus on materialistic goals 
tend to overvalue the importance of acquiring materialistic goods and status which make 
them experience a gap between their current situation and what they want to have. This gap 
makes them feel insecure about their current situation, while achieving materialistic goals 
only leads to a temporary improvement of their self-esteem (Kasser, 2002, p. 59).  
In short, a strong focus on materialistic goals seems to be directly related to the 
negative counterparts of engagement and attunement and, given the emotional state theory 
here adopted, we can conclude that it is a contributor to unhappiness.   
  A vast body of the research done in Kasser’s book is conducted in the United States. 
However, references to studies of the link between materialism and mental illnesses in e.g., 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Russia, India and China, show similar findings (Kasser, 2002, 
p. 21). Kasser never explicitly refers to the actual amount of people who have a strong focus 
on materialistic values. However, there are two reasons to believe that a strong focus on 
materialistic values has strong ties with development of depression, anxiety and social 
disorders that contribute to unhappiness. The first reason is the large amount of empirical 
studies that suggest there is a strong correlation between mental illness and having a strong 
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focus on materialistic values (summarised earlier in this section). This does not automatically 
mean that there is also a high prevalence of people who have a strong focus on materialistic 
values. However, it does indicate that materialism is an important contributor to the high 
prevalence of mental illnesses. The second reason is derived from the work of Oliver James 
(2007). In this work, it is illustrated that countries with a higher prevalence of materialistic 
values also show higher rates of mental illnesses. This is an important additional point 
because it not only supports the claim that materialism is an important contributor to the high 
prevalence of mental illnesses, but it also implies that there is a high prevalence of 
materialistic values in countries with high rates of mental illnesses in the first place. Showing 
that there is a high prevalence of materialistic values is important because a hypothetical low 
prevalence of materialistic values cannot be held (largely) responsible for high rates of 
mental illnesses.   
 Criticism of Kasser’s work mainly concentrates on the credibility of his data. 
According to one of the criticisms (Easterlin, 2004), Kasser builds his argument on a couple 
of studies which mainly used psychology students as respondents, and therefore do not 
represent the diversity in a society. However, the large quantity of empirical research used 
in the work still contains many examples that do not use psychology students as a sample 
pool.  
Also, according to another critic, Kasser seems to ignore the fact that work can also 
contribute to the fulfilling of psychological needs, rather than solely being a cause for stress 
(Domagalski, 2004, p. 136). The benefits of work indeed seem to be neglected in Kasser’s 
book. However, work itself is not the target of Kasser’s criticism; it is the strong focus on 
materialistic values that is criticised. Even though work might be beneficial for a person, it 
does not undermine his thesis that a strong focus on a materialistic pursuit contributes to 
unhappiness. 
Finally, one could object that Kasser’s focus is misplaced: post-materialistic values, 
such as autonomy and self-expression, are now more prevalent. Therefore, “materialism” 
and “materialistic values” might be outdated terms. This could partly be agreed upon. 
However, according to Tony Fitzpatrick, having a strong materialistic pursuit in the practice 
of daily life is still very relevant:   
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 Certainly, we spend much of our lives valuing intangibles such as love and friendship; at least, we  
 tell ourselves often enough that this is what we do. But when asked to consider the nature of the  
 public realm and of social interaction, most people seem to push such intangibles into the  
 background so that the quality of life means little more than the standard of living. There are often  
 very good reasons for this, e.g. a fear of poverty disciplines us into a narrow range of lifestyles and  
 forces upon us myopic conceptions of the good. Undoubtedly, post-materialistic values are now  
 more prevalent throughout the West, but these values do not necessarily translate into  
 post-materialistic practices. (1999 p. 182, 183)   
  
  If a strong focus on materialistic goals distracts us from experiences conducive to 
positive central affective states, then why are so many people intent on pursuing goals that 
do not make them happy? The yearly occurrence rate of mental illness in the US was found 
to be 26.2 percent (Haybron, 2008, p. 219). Such a high rate of mental illness does not seem 
to fit with the 92 percent of people who report being happy (ibid, p. 216). The difference 
between high rates of happiness in subjective assessment of happiness and the high 
prevalence of mental illnesses (of which depression and anxiety have the largest share) 
seems to imply that many people are unreliable in knowing whether they are unhappy.  
An alternative explanation could be that people respond to these surveys according 
to social expectations, and not according to how they actually feel. This could account for a 
partial explanation of the discrepancy between high rates of happiness in self-reports and a 
high prevalence of mental illnesses. However, it is not likely that this could explain the 
majority of this discrepancy. There are two reasons for this. First, self-reports of happiness 
tend to be only slightly higher in personal interviews compared to anonymous self-reports 
(Veenhoven, 2015). This means that the incentive to provide socially desirable answers 
would only explain a minor difference. Second, the discrepancy is supported by studies that 
compared the usage of self-reports with a mental health assessment by clinicians. These 
studies included also an assessment of physiological responses, such as blood pressure 
(Shedler, Mayman & Manis, 1993). The conclusion drawn was that a majority of the people 
that were rated mentally healthy by the self-reports turned out to be “deemed to be 
distressed” by the results of the clinical assessment that included physiological responses 
(Haybron 2008, p. 218). It is unlikely that the participants of this study provided socially 
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desirable answers in the self-report while knowing that there was also a clinical assessment 
that could bring an inflated happiness self-report to light.  
These two replies to an alternative explanation (people deliberately inflate their 
happiness reports to meet social expectations) provide additional support for the statement 
that people are actually unreliable at knowing whether they are happy.  
 
 The corroboration from the physiological data, along with the highly negative appraisals for  
  some of those classified as defensive deniers, strongly indicates that some, and possibly even most,  
  of those rated as healthy by the self-report-based scales have serious deficiencies in their emotional  
 conditions.. [..] We should take seriously the possibility that very many people are substantially  
 mistaken about how happy they are. (Haybron, 2008, p. 218 & p. 221)   
 
 It is possible to put question marks behind the high rates of mental illnesses, because one 
can discuss about what exactly contributes to a mental illness or even if a mental illness 
exists as such. The point is that these studies do show that a great deal of the central affective 
states that contribute to happiness are altered despite many people not realising that they are 
unhappy.  
  If there is such difference between the high depression rates and subjective measures 
of happiness, it seems worthwhile to explore why we are unreliable at knowing both whether 
we are happy and what makes us happy.  
 
3.2 Why we are unreliable at knowing what makes us happy 
 This section will show that there are good reasons to believe we are indeed unreliable 
at knowing what makes us happy. Daniel Haybron (2008) proposes several factors that make 
us unreliable at knowing what makes us happy. In this thesis I will refer to them as factors 
that contribute to the epistemic problem of happiness. The latter will sometimes be 
abbreviated as ‘the epistemic problem’. Not all the factors indicated by Haybron are 
explained here. Six factors are highlighted. The first two are on a more general note, the 
other four are used because they are the factors that are likely altered by basic income (next 
chapter).  
  The first two factors contributing to the epistemic problem of happiness are central 
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to the notion of “affective ignorance”. Affective ignorance entails two epistemic failures: we 
are ignorant about our past states of affect and ignorant about present states of affect. 
Ignorance of our past states of affect is due to the fact that we process a large amount of 
experiences every day, making it impossible to bring all these experiences into account 
accurately when assessing the quality of one’s experiences. Ignorance of present affects 
means that we are unreliable at judging our current state of affect. For example, when we 
are in a bad mood, we cannot relate the bad mood to a physical location as we do with 
physical pain when we hit our head. We cannot properly get hold of the bad mood because 
it is a highly diffuse state (Haybron, 2008, p. 203). As a consequence, we might ignore or 
neglect the different and potentially complex reasons for the bad mood.  
 A third factor that Haybron identifies is concerned with the assumption that people 
normally pursue what they need depending on the degree they actually need it. Haybron 
doubts this assumption (ibid, p. 240) by suggesting that our ancestors had needs such as 
relationships, connectedness with environment, and meaningful activities already 
automatically met, and therefore had no specific motivation to pursue them. These needs 
were automatically met because of the close communities people lived in that required 
(meaningful) contributions for the survival of everybody. We were disposed to be engaged 
in meaningful activities, relations and connection with the environment because they were 
part of our survival kit in this ancestral environment. Today, the environment changed and 
those needs are not met automatically anymore, but we still need to meet these essential 
needs. The motivation to meet these needs does not come automatically, because we have 
not evolved to know they are essential. We are not naturally motivated to pursue them. 
Therefore, our not knowing that these needs are essential for our happiness contributes to 
our not knowing what makes us happy. Hence, the previous two factors are about our own 
ignorance of whether we are happy. This factor, however, is concerned with what makes us 
happy. Haybron identifies this third factor, us not being disposed to be motivated to pursue 
essential psychological needs, as a crucial point because it provides the possibility that 
essential psychological needs can be neglected without people being aware of it. 
 A fourth factor contributing to the epistemic problem of happiness in Haybron’s 
work is summarised in the term “lay rationalism”. Lay rationalism describes a tendency 
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where people make decisions based on rationalistic considerations, e.g., economic values. 
As a result of this tendency, “soft values”, e.g. the value of an experience as such, or 
increased happiness, can be easily neglected or suppressed (ibid, p. 234-236). For example, 
decisions about employment are more readily and easily based on monetary value and the 
potential possessions that can be acquired, because these “hard values” seem easier to 
measure and to communicate. Soft values are usually much harder to communicate because 
they tend to be subjective and intangible. Hard values are therefore easier to justify to oneself 
and others, creating a bias in decisions and assessments regarding one’s happiness. Because 
of a bias towards choosing experiences on the basis of hard values, we are less likely to know 
which experiences would contribute the most to our happiness. For example, consider the 
following scenarios. One experience involves teaching a class of mathematics. It pays 50 
euros but you actually do not like teaching mathematics. The other experience involves 
teaching a class voluntarily about a topic that you feel passionate about, that feels fulfilling 
to teach, in other words: an activity that puts you in a state of “flow”. In the light of the 
emotional state theory, the second teaching experience is likely to bring us more happiness 
than the first. However, given our “lay rationalism”, we will never know it if we are biased 
to choose the first based on the hard value here represented by the 50 euros.     
 A fifth factor is the adaptation to persistent affect (ibid, p. 205). This entails that even 
if we find some things irritating or actually pleasant, they may tend to become adapted in 
our daily lives, eventually not being noticed anymore. In other words, our awareness of 
certain pleasant or unpleasant things seems to fade, while the pleasant or unpleasant things 
persist and are only recognised when they cease to exist. An example of this can be found in 
the difference between someone who recently experienced a great amount of stress and 
someone who has experienced the same amount of stress but already for a decade. It seems 
safe to say that the first person assesses the stress as a greater negative influence on one’s 
happiness than the latter person would, thus indicating that the latter person shows a 
diminished awareness of her state of happiness. It is important to emphasise that a decreased 
awareness of a great deal of stress through adaptation has negative consequences in terms of 
one’s happiness. As previously shown, experiencing stress directly affects the attunement 
state in Haybron’s theory. Becoming adapted to stress hides from our view the negative 
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influence that stress has on our emotional condition, thus making it harder to take notice of 
it and do something about it. 
 The sixth and last factor is concerned with the so-called peak-end effect and the 
neglect of duration in assessing our happiness. Haybron draws here on studies (ibid, p. 211) 
that show how the assessment of our experiences is biased by the peak of our experience. 
For example, a multiple day hike that turns out to be utterly boring can be assessed in his 
wholeness as exciting and fun if there were two minutes spent watching a bear catching 
salmon in the river. This implies that the duration of unpleasant events is neglected and the 
peak effect of an experience is prioritised in the assessment of the experience.   
 These six factors explain why we are unreliable at knowing what makes us happy, 
explaining why many people are unhappy, despite positive reports in subjective 
measurements of happiness. In the upcoming chapter, it will be argued that there are good 
reasons to assume that basic income will decrease the epistemic problem of happiness. This 
will be done by showing that the introduction of a basic income provides an incentive to 
overcome some (specifically, the latter four) of the factors that contribute to the epistemic 
problem of happiness.   
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Chapter IV How basic income alleviates the epistemic problem of  
happiness 
  It will be argued that a basic income provides an incentive to inhibit four of the 
identified factors that contribute to the epistemic problem of happiness. This will partly be 
done by showing how a basic income helps to focus less on materialistic values. 
  Introducing a basic income will not affect every contributing factor of the epistemic 
problem of happiness. People may well remain unreliable at knowing what makes them 
happy after the introduction of a basic income. However, a basic income will decrease the 
influence of four of the described factors, therefore contributing at least in some degree to 
the reliability of knowing what makes us happy. This decreased influence is a result of 
favouring a social environment that encourages a shift from materialistic values. The 
arguments made in this chapter are based on the assumption that a basic income will work 
similar to the findings from the empirical studies mentioned in the first chapter. Or more 
precisely, the assumption that a basic income works favourably by greatly increasing 
entrepreneurship, fulfilling hobbies, volunteer work, and by decreasing mental health 
problems, while the possible reduction in total work hours remains limited and is 
compensated by e.g. education. This assumption would stand in contrast with a different 
possibility: a basic income will make people lazy (e.g. van der Veen, 2000, p. 137) and 
lonely (Harris, 2016). These possibilities are addressed in the next chapter (chapter V).  
  The first factor that will be altered by a basic income is concerned with the 
assumption that people pursue what they need. This assumption was argued to be false, 
because we are not motivated to pursue needs that were formerly automatically met in our 
ancestral environment (meaningful relationships, meaningful activities and engagement with 
the environment) (Haybron, 2008, p. 240). A basic income would not by any means bring 
us back to an ancestral environment where these essential psychological needs are 
automatically met, but it will facilitate an environment where these essential needs can be 
met with greater ease. Luigino Bruni (2012) reports a decrease in happiness as an 
unintentional consequence from not having enough relational goods (Bruni 2012, p. 399). 
Relational goods are “goods which can be produced, exchanged and enjoyed by individuals 
only if they are shared with others in non-anonymous social interactions” (Paganetto, 2014, 
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p. 108). Implementation of a basic income would boost the consumption and production of 
relational goods, because it provides the security for people to spend time doing unpaid 
work. Basic income could therefore stimulate volunteer work (Birnbaum, 2012, p. 195, 220). 
Volunteer work strengthens social connections, builds strong cohesive communities and 
enhances civic engagement while delivering goods and services (Wu, 2011, p. 6-11), 
therefore increasing consumption of relational goods and thus contributing to the essential 
need of meaningful relationships. Regarding the need to engage in meaningful activities, a 
basic income is also seen as a system that would “create a platform for meaningful work” 
(Healy et al, 2013 p. 119). The reason is that a basic income compensates for work that is 
not paid. Therefore, people have the possibility to do the work that they find meaningful 
(ibidem). A basic income would also provide an incentive for meeting the third 
psychological need: engagement with the environment. For example, one of the 
contributions to finance a basic income comes from the proposal of an environmental tax. 
Burdening the consumption of less-environmentally friendly products will help consumers 
to signify the link between certain products and their effect on the environment (European 
Environment Agency, 1996). Moreover, a basic income is considered a possible measure to 
“move away from the present economic system of maximum economic growth with no 
consideration of finite resources, towards a sustainable model of development [...]’. (Healy 
et al, 2013 p. 120). These three arguments imply that a basic income favours an environment 
where essential basic needs, such as, meaningful relationships, engagement with the 
environment and meaningful activities, become more salient, and thus more likely to be 
pursued. In other words, a basic income would facilitate the engagement in activities that are 
not solely concerned with materialistic values, thus, encouraging people to focus less on 
materialistic values.  
 The second factor positively affected by the introduction of basic income is 
concerned with the previously described term “lay rationalism”. Lay rationalism describes a 
tendency to make decisions based on rationalistic considerations (e.g. monetary values, 
material assets) rather than on “soft” values (e.g. emotions or the value of an experience). 
Since soft values are more difficult to describe and practically impossible to quantify, we 
tend to disregard them when we assess our happiness. This factor is changed by the 
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introduction of basic income, because it will decrease the importance of basing decisions on 
hard values. The reason for this is that the monetary requirements for satisfying basic needs 
would be already met, therefore decreasing the pressure to base decisions on monetary 
values. Basic income is likely to encourage people to base decisions on soft values. The 
reason for this is that, for example, workplaces and the actual work itself have the potential 
to become more attractive and meaningful for workers, because employees will have more 
bargaining power over their workplace (van Parijs 1995, p. 95). People will have the 
possibility to choose jobs in accordance to preferences, therefore providing a more 
supportive environment to base decisions regarding one’s happiness more on soft values. It 
might be objected that bargaining power is a relative concept, and employers who will have 
to adapt their workplaces accordingly might be negatively affected because of the effort they 
will have to invest in the restructuring of the workplace. Nonetheless, basic income promotes 
“soft values” for employers as well. They will make their investment choices in the light of 
soft values just as employees will make their career choices based on soft values. Moreover, 
the efforts made by employers to change the workplace are unlikely to outweigh the long 
term benefits of becoming more reliable at knowing what makes one happy. Additionally, 
being encouraged to base decisions more readily on soft values need not be constrained to 
work related considerations. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, basic income also 
provides more financial space and time to engage oneself in hobbies or other non-work 
related activities, where “soft values” are likely to be even more salient.   
 The third factor with the potential to be changed by a basic income is the adaptation 
to persistent affect. This concerned the tendency to get used to, and thus to fail to notice, 
certain persisting pleasant or unpleasant features in one’s life. A basic income will not 
directly reduce affective adaptation. However, it will provide an environment that makes 
people more likely to become aware of persisting unpleasant features. The main reason for 
this effect is that the environment of people with a basic income is more likely to be diverse. 
For example, labour markets become more flexible (van Parijs 1995, p. 256). If people are 
in a better position to switch jobs or start their own business, it is safe to say that they will 
be exposed to more diverse work environments, increasing the likelihood that persisting 
unpleasant features in one’s working life are noticed due to these changes. Apart from the 
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work environment, a basic income would also affect life outside work. For example, having 
one’s basic needs met through a basic income allows people the time and financial security 
to engage in activities that they otherwise did not have enough time for. This would mean 
that there is more time for activities such as hobbies or taking care of the children. Providing 
the possibility to spend more time outside work would also contribute to the diversity of 
activities outside the (paid) work environment, therefore increasing the likelihood that 
persisting unpleasant features outside the work environment are easier noticed as well. Or, 
again in other words to explain the relation with materialistic values: If a basic income 
provides a more flexible work environment as well as more flexibility outside work, it will 
be plausible to say that, due to this more diverse environment, long persisting unpleasant 
features such as long stressful work hours needed in order to attain materialistic goals, will 
be more easily noticed as negatively affecting one’s happiness. Through this factor of the 
epistemic problem of happiness it can be seen how a basic income helps to reduce the focus 
on materialistic values. Discouraging materialistic values is, again, part of the process in 
showing why a basic income alleviates the epistemic problem of happiness.  
 The fourth and last factor altered by basic income is the bias of peak-end effects of 
experiences. This factor showed how we are unreliable at knowing what makes us happy 
because we tend to prioritise peak-end effects of experiences rather than the whole duration. 
Basic income does not reduce the actual tendency to prioritise peak-end effects, but rather 
the environment that will make us more likely to prioritise peak effects. To illustrate this 
change in environment, it will be shown how peak-end effects were previously prioritised in 
assessing happiness outside the work environment. Consider the observation that attaining 
materialistic goals tend to bring about a short and sharp increase of happiness, before quickly 
declining to the level prior to consumption (Kasser, 2002, p. 27, 49). Experiencing short-
lived peak-end effects of happiness through buying products outside the work contrasts with 
the lack of peak-end effects in the considerably longer work process. There is a sharp 
distinction between the lack of peak effects in a longer of process of work compared to the 
short-lived  ‘high’ experienced by attaining some materialistic goal. A basic income would 
provide an incentive to level experienced peak-end effects inside and outside work 
environment more equally. Behavioural economist Wesel Pech explains how a basic income 
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would increase the amount of jobs in which people have intrinsic motivation to perform well 
(Pech, 2011, p. 9). This observation, together with the earlier prediction of jobs becoming 
more attractive, implies that people will be more likely to experience positive peak-end 
effects in a work environment. If people are in any case biased to base decisions on peak-
end experiences, then the creation of a work environment in which people experience more 
peak-end effects suggests the possibility for a more equalised assessment of the 
considerations relevant to one’s happiness. If we follow this argument further into the work 
environment, then experiencing peak effects from an accomplishment after a long work 
struggle (for example, a performance-related bonus) might still make us unreliable at 
assessing whether or not this long struggle was worth it. This might indeed be the case, but 
a basic income might also alter this effect. The reason for this is that the greater flexibility a 
basic income provides regarding choosing one’s job, might provoke an assessment that relies 
more on the “long struggle” aspect of that job, rather than the peak-end effect of the 
accomplishment. This is because a basic income provides financial security and a better 
bargaining position when choosing a job, thus providing the possibility for a more thorough 
assessment of the different aspects of the considered work and the processes it consists of. 
This will make people more likely to be aware of a potential “long struggle” aspect of a job, 
therefore also more likely to not overvalue the peak-end effect of work-related 
accomplishments. Again in other words, a more even distribution of peak-end effects in and 
outside work make people less likely to overvalue the short lived increase of happiness 
through focusing on materialistic goals (be those consumeristic or a work-related bonus), 
showing that basic income reduces both the epistemic problem as well as the focus on 
materialistic goals.  
 This chapter showed how the introduction of a basic income can reduce the impact 
of four factors that contribute to the epistemic problem of happiness. Materialistic values are 
an important aspect of these four factors, illustrating both how a basic income decreases a 
strong focus on materialistic value, as well as alleviates the epistemic problem of happiness.
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Chapter V  Laziness and loneliness 
  The positive effects on the epistemic problem as described in the previous chapter 
are only likely to work if the empirical findings from the basic income experiments that have 
been conducted can actually work on a larger scale. Apart from the potential positive effects 
such as: increased entrepreneurship, more flexibility in choosing one’s job, increased 
volunteer work, there is also the possibility that people become lazy or lonely. It seems safe 
to say that, if basic income contributes to people becoming lazy (i.e. inactive) and/or lonely, 
in general we cannot expect it to have positive consequences in terms of people’s happiness, 
or in terms of alleviating the epistemic problem of happiness. So this chapter discusses why 
people might become lonely or lazy. The loneliness and laziness objection will be separately 
examined. It will not be argued that nobody will become lazy or lonely after implementing 
a basic income; basic income might result in some people becoming lazy or lonely. The main 
aim of this chapter is to illustrate that laziness and loneliness will not undermine the 
alleviation of the epistemic problem.  
 
4.1 Laziness 
  The problem with becoming lazy is well captured in the following quote from 
Widerquist (2013, p. 80):  
 
  Basic income is an unconditional payment, usually proposed at a level high enough to live on.  
  This creates the possibility for people to stop working and live off the basic income only, and  
 spend all their time on leisure activities.  
 
If many people decide to stop working completely and become lazy, basic income might not 
be financially feasible because there are not enough people working to generate enough tax 
revenue to fund basic income. More relevantly for this thesis, if indeed many people become 
lazy, the argued positive implications for the epistemic problem might not take place because 
they are based on the assumption that people do make proper use of the possibilities that a 
basic income provides, instead of becoming lazy. In this thesis, “becoming lazy” does not 
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only entail that a person stops working, but also means that the person will be inactive in 
pursuing and exploring his or her interests outside the work environment. In other words, a 
form of inactivity that entails not making use of the possibilities that a basic income provides. 
Laziness does certainly not equate with being unemployed, the term is solely used in this 
thesis because the term is used by opponents of basic income as an objection. To understand 
if laziness would be a difficulty for basic income to alter the epistemic problem, first, the 
reasons behind the possibility of people becoming lazy will need to be identified. There are 
three interrelated dynamics that contribute to the possibility of becoming lazy. These 
contributing dynamics can be described as (1) social stigma that results from a sharp 
distinction in discourse between employment and unemployment, (2) a dissolved link 
between work and income, and (3) a developed incentive-based structure of the workplace. 
These three dynamics require an explanation.   
 The first dynamic is the stigma resulting from a sharp distinction between 
employment and unemployment. This is explained to follow from governmental policies and 
a dominant moral discourse, both promoting the sharp distinction between people who work 
and people who do not work:  
 
 It [the dominant moral discourse regarding employment/unemployment] enables everyone in  
 employment to understand themselves as virtuous, and as belonging to society in ways in which  
 those not in employment do not belong; and it enables harsh sanctions to be imposed on people  
 who are unemployed: a strategy that appears to be designed to perpetuate the stated social division  
 in the public mind. (Torry, 2016, p. 89) (text in brackets added)  
 
The social stigma resulting from this sharp distinction between employment and 
unemployment labels people as lazy or failures when applying for means-tested benefits 
(Standing 2009, p. 140). As a result of this stigma, people who are or become unemployed, 
are confirmed in their inability to conform to the standard of employment and therefore 
demotivated to look for work (or become demotivated to pursue other interests). This claim 
is supported by a study conducted on stigmatisation and unemployment data in Germany, 
and concludes that stigmatisation is one explanation for the persistent and high 
unemployment rates in Germany (Biewen and Steffes, 2010). Thus, the main aim of the 
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sharp distinction between employment and unemployment—motivating people to get back 
to work—has actually a demotivating effect. People who are subject to the stigma, because 
they are or become unemployed, are confirmed in their inability and therefore might become 
lazy. Hence, the social stigma that demotivates people to work is only contributing to make 
(or maintain) unemployed people lazy. It does not affect people who are employed, as they 
will not be subject to the social stigma.  
  The second dynamic, the dissolved link between work and income, follows from the 
following historical background, best explained by Van der Veen (2000, p. 84):    
 
 The spectre of individualism, released by the Reformation and the Enlightenment, activated the  
 values of industriousness, hard work, thrift, entrepreneurship, and ‘deferred gratification’ in  
 early-modern capitalism. Under the welfare state, ironically, individualism has encouraged the  
 development of an alternative ‘hedonist’ ethos, which is fundamentally at odds with the original  
 sober mentality of early-modern capitalism. Having dissolved the ‘sacred’ link between work and  
 income, the welfare state contributed to the erosion of the traditional work ethic as a central point  
 of moral reference.  
 
Van der Veen explains that the means-tested benefits from the welfare state “dissolved the 
‘sacred’ link between work and income, the welfare state has come to undermine the 
motivation to seek gainful employment” (van der Veen, 2000, p. 137). If van der Veen is 
right, and furthermore if basic income is seen as an expression of the same welfare state that 
provides means-tested benefits, then it might be argued that basic income also erodes that 
sacred link, with the result that people will not be motivated to seek work for income. In 
other words, more people might become lazy.  
However, the first described dynamic, unemployed people becoming lazy from 
social stigma, could conflict with this second dynamic. The reason for this is that if we 
assume that there is social stigma and people feel demotivated by this, then it means that 
there is also a strong work ethic that makes unemployed people perceive this social stigma. 
They relate themselves to this strong work ethic because otherwise they would not 
experience the social stigma in the first place. The existence of the stigma might be 
troublesome for this second dynamic, because it implies that there is after all a strong work 
ethic still in place, despite the welfare state. However, if we look closer, the work ethic does 
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not necessarily seem to result in a conflict between these two dynamics. It seems that the 
two dynamics are targeting two different groups of people: unemployed people who become 
lazy because they experience the social stigma as they relate themselves to the strong work 
ethic, and people who do not relate to the strong work ethic but become lazy because they 
perceive a dissolved link between work and income. Therefore, the two dynamics are not 
conflicting but rather have their emphasis on different groups.   
 The third dynamic requires a more extensive explanation. This dynamic entails the 
observation that our institutions are built around “hard” values or more specifically extrinsic 
rewards to incentivise people to work. Barry Schwartz recognises that the dominant structure 
in workplaces uses incentives to motivate people to work (2015, p. 60). This is partly 
explained by the piecemeal production model of the modern factory, which divides labour 
into small tasks easy to perform and practically meaningless as such. And it seems that the 
only reward for people to choose such jobs must be extrinsic, i.e. a monetary reward. It could 
be said that the idea to organise work around monetary incentives is shown to be mistaken, 
because of a large amount of studies that replicate the same finding:  payment is not the only 
reason why people work (Schwarz, 2015, and for references to empirical studies: Pink, 
2009). For example, a sense of fulfilment and autonomy in one’s work is seen as an important 
reason for people to work. However, as capitalism further developed, incentives such as 
meaning and autonomy of one’s own work were for the majority ignored in the creation of 
workplaces but also, more importantly, in the expectations people had from work. Schwartz 
explains that Adam Smith’s view that people work only for pay actually became true:  
 
 The lesson here is that just how important material incentives are to people will depend on how the  
 human workplace is structured. And if we structure it in keeping with the false idea that people  
 work only for pay, we’ll create workplaces that make this false idea true. (Schwartz, 2015, p. 12) 
 
It is true that workplaces seem to have changed; for a large amount of people, jobs have 
become more interesting, flexible and self-directed (Pink, 2009). Nonetheless, the prevailing 
structure of incentives remains, according to Schwartz, deeply rooted in our motivation and 
workplaces (2015, p. 59). This is strengthened by a worldwide poll conducted by Gallup 
Unconditional Basic Income and the Epistemic Problem of Happiness by Bastiaan Meinders 
 
34 
 
(20131). According to this poll, conducted in 142 countries, 13 percent of people are feeling 
passionate about their activities on daily basis, 24 percent hates their job and 63 percent does 
not feel engaged at work.  
 
 Unless there is a collective effort to combat this ideology, we will all become the lazy, selfish  
  pursuers of self-interest, not just in work but in our lives as a whole, that at least some social  
  scientists have assumed we always were. (Schwartz 2015, p. 60)  
 
The bottom line is that, for a large part, we became conditioned to work because of an 
external reward. This also means that, if the reward normally associated with work becomes 
available to all without the need to work—as it is automatically provided by the basic 
income—people might no longer see any reason to work. In short, if people are conditioned 
to work for external incentives, and this incentive now gets provided independently of work, 
people might become lazy.  
 To sum up, the three dynamics identified are: a demotivating social stigma against 
the unemployed, a dissolved link between work and income, and a structure of incentives 
that dominate the workplace. If basic income pushes people to laziness in one or more of 
these three ways, and if laziness (in the sense of being inactive specified above) contributes 
negatively to both happiness and to people’s knowledge of their happiness, then basic 
income will not alleviate the epistemic problem. In the next section, I will attack the first 
claim. 
 
4.2 Basic income and laziness 
  Are the loneliness and laziness objections troublesome for the alleviation of the 
epistemic problem through basic income? It will be shown that the alleviation of the 
epistemic problem is largely unaffected by the loneliness and laziness objection. “Largely” 
unaffected because basic income would never fully undermine all the dynamics that are 
contributing to people becoming lazy or lonely.    
                                                 
 
1 2013 is the most recent worldwide poll conducted by Gallup at the time of writing. 
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  Generally speaking, basic income is likely to result in alterations of the just described 
dynamics that contribute to people becoming lazy. This is mainly because basic income is 
different from means-tested benefits. More specifically, the first and second dynamic in the 
laziness objection are built on characteristics of means-tested benefits. However, basic 
income does not have these characteristics and therefore, does not contribute to these two 
dynamics. In fact, the introduction of basic income will undermine all the three dynamics 
mentioned above. The first two because they are built on characteristics of means-tested 
benefits and the third because basic income has the potential to encourage an environment 
that reduces the importance of external incentives. The next paragraphs will show exactly 
how these three dynamics are undermined by basic income. 
  Concerning the first dynamic, basic income “blurs” a sharp moral distinction 
between employed (“good”) and unemployed living on benefits (“bad”). The very idea of a 
category of people living on benefits (and thus, “milking” public resources) will disappear, 
and with it the social stigma against these people. And if the stigma is removed, people 
otherwise not employed will not suffer the demotivating effects of the stigma. Even if still 
unemployed, they might find new motivation to be active in alternative ways. For example, 
unpaid work (e.g. volunteer work), as indirectly compensated for by basic income, will be 
recognised as at least comparable to paid work (Healy et al., 2013, p. 119). Moral discourse 
is likely to change because being “virtuous” will not strictly depend on being employed or 
not, but more according to your contribution to the community or society. This would mean 
that people would still be motivated to be active, just not necessarily in ways directly related 
to employment, but rather according to their individual contribution to the community or 
society. 
As for the impact on the second dynamic, it must be remembered that basic income 
promises to remove the disincentive to work which formerly resulted from the means-tested 
driven unemployment trap, because finding work will not entail a direct reduction or 
deduction from the basic income (Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 52). This qualitative difference from 
welfare state benefits means that basic income has the potential to be an invigorating factor 
in people’s willingness to work, thus blocking the weakening effects of the welfare state that 
van der Veen pointed at.  
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In sum, when we look at the first two dynamics of laziness, it can be seen that the 
introduction of basic income would rather undermine them than favour them. If this is true, 
then, in turn, basic income still has the full potential to reduce the epistemic problem of 
happiness.  
As for the third dynamic, recall the way that we incentivise people. Because of the 
unconditionality aspect of the basic income, a rigorous policy change is adopted that could 
break the dominant “carrot and stick” incentive structure. There is good reason to believe 
that basic income encourages people to think beyond external incentives, because the 
financial space is provided to do so. If people diverge from prioritising external incentives 
as the main reason to work, it becomes indeed more likely that people think differently about 
unpaid work that fosters meaningful relationships and meaningful activities. People would 
be less inclined to solely pursue external rewards; therefore it becomes more likely that 
people consider volunteer work or meaningful work regardless of the pay. If people become 
less dependent on external incentives, then people are also less likely to become lazy. This 
is because, when considering to engage in an activity that does not offer a significant external 
incentive, people are more likely to engage in this activity (if they are otherwise attracted to 
it), because their decision will depend less on the presence of such external incentives. In 
other words, basic income will provide the opportunity to choose certain careers or certain 
jobs for their own sake, rather than push people to inactivity because of the immediate 
availability of financial resources that earlier had to be earned through work. This way also 
the third dynamic will be undermined by basic income. 
In sum, even if it cannot be ruled out that some people will choose a lazy life, and 
thus will miss out on the positive impact of basic income on the epistemic problem of 
happiness, there is good reason to believe that the dynamics that push people to laziness will 
in fact be obstacled by basic income. 
 
4.3 Loneliness 
  The possibility that people may become lonely is formulated by Max Harris (2016). 
Harris starts from the remark that people in many relatively wealthy countries have a strong 
individualistic focus on their own interests and ambitions as opposed to the interests of 
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others. There are several studies that argue for the same observation (James, 2007). 
Moreover, Harris observes that interpersonal contact is already limited in current society due 
to technological advancement, specifically in communication. Examples are given of limited 
face-to-face contact because we increasingly often communicate through mobile phones and 
the internet. An implementation of basic income in an already individualised and 
technologically advanced society could make people more lonely and individualistic than 
they already were. Harris provides two specific reasons that could contribute to more people 
becoming lonely. The first is best described in the following quote:  
 
 First, though the Universal Basic Income claims to give people the ‘freedom’ to spend the income  
 however they want, that freedom is conditioned by dominant thinking in contemporary society. In  
 a society where individuals may be more reluctant than ever to initiate face-to-face contact [..], it is  
 plausible that the payment of a basic income will lead to people curling up in individualistic  
 cocoons rather than reaching out to initiate communal interaction (Harris, 2016, p. 2).  
 
In other words, a basic income could result in a withdrawal of people from social contact 
that they previously gained from work. Thus, if basic income makes people decide to give 
up work, they will not enjoy the social interaction gained from work and therefore become 
lonely. Here we already see a connection with the previous laziness objection. 
The second reason entails the lack of an environment that sparks social interaction. 
According to Harris, a basic income would not come with the “public infrastructure to 
underscore the value of the community” (ibid, p. 1). It lacks an element that other 
government initiatives do provide. For example, when a government provides free healthcare 
it also provides the physical public space where this free health care takes place. It is a public 
space where people have the opportunity to interact with each other. Harris explains that a 
basic income provides the individual benefit but does not come with the second element, the 
public space that provides a basis for community interaction.     
  Both, an individualistic mindset in combination with technological advancement and 
the lack of the provision of a public infrastructure, contribute to the risk of people becoming 
lonely. And if many people become lonely, the epistemic problem of happiness will not be 
alleviated, and possibly will be even made worse, since lonely people are probably not 
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particularly good at knowing what makes them happy. In Haybron’s view, it is often only 
thanks to the contact with others who know us well that we might learn whether we are 
happy or not. Moreover, some specific factors of the epistemic problem seem to be 
aggravated. For example, by becoming lonely we will be even further away from recognising 
and meeting essential needs such as the need for meaningful relationships. Or again, by 
becoming lonely our adaptation to persistent affect may well be exacerbated, since there will 
be fewer people around us to make us notice, for example, how stressed we are by our work 
routine. 
 
4.4 Basic income and loneliness 
 The answer to these worries relies in large part on pointing out the connections 
between the dynamics of loneliness and those of laziness. The choice of a lonely life, of 
course, cannot be entirely prevented by basic income. Some people choose a life in solitude 
because it is a conscious decision and some people might still become unwillingly lonely 
with a basic income. But as seen above, basic income can operate on the dynamics of work 
and laziness, and this has implications for loneliness too.  
 If basic income makes people diverge from prioritising external incentives as the 
main reason to work, it becomes likely that people will think differently about how their 
work fosters meaningful relationships. In other words, people would be less inclined to 
solely pursue external rewards; therefore it becomes more likely that people will regard 
meaningful relationships as a more important element in their consideration of an activity. 
This would make them less likely to become lonely in two ways: people might find 
themselves less lonely in the workplace itself, and also they might choose unpaid work, for 
example volunteer work, which promotes interaction within the community. 
 Further, the removal of the social stigma linked to unemployment will also remove 
a feeling of isolation of the unemployed people from the rest of society. 
Finally, if is true that basic income will free up time and energy previously spent on 
working, then it is plausible to assume that some of this time and energy will be spent on 
personal relationships. 
Despite this, people could still become lonely. Harris explained that one of the 
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reasons for becoming lonely is the technological advancement in an already individualised 
society. This would mean that we first need to assume that basic income will indeed make 
people favour working and communication through digital technology. If we follow this line 
of thought, people could remain active and engage in social interaction, but become isolated 
from the physical presence of others. People could become lonely and still be active because 
they solely communicate and work through digital communication and work platforms. 
Whether or not this observation is troublesome for my argument seems to depend on how 
loneliness is defined. It could be argued that people who are active and social solely through 
digital technology are actually not lonely because they are still interacting with others and 
are still able to build meaningful relations, especially if digital interactions (e.g. through 
video) become more similar to actual physical interaction. Moreover, it remains unclear 
whether basic income will actually make people favour work and communication through 
digital technology in the first place. 
It also needs to be stressed that loneliness might be only a temporary consequence of 
the introduction of basic income. For example, basic income would allow people to quit their 
unpleasant jobs with more security. In this sense, these people may choose an inactive and 
thus lonely life for a while. Still, quitting such jobs would also put them in the position to be 
better aware of adaptation to persistent affect, as pointed out in chapter IV. These persons 
will now be in a better position to know what makes them happy. It might be that for people 
like this, being lonely or not engaging in many social interactions might be a conscious 
decision, but then in this case this would not necessarily make them unhappy. 
If, on the other hand, loneliness does contribute to unhappiness, such people at least 
do not run the risk of becoming adapted to their lonely and sad state. Thanks to the break 
from their ordinary routine afforded by basic income, they are now in a position to defend 
themselves from negative affective adaptation. Hence, the affective adaptation described in 
chapter IV also implies that people who quit their jobs and become lonely are likely to 
become aware of this lonely state because the lonely state contrasts with the social interaction 
previously enjoyed in work. If loneliness is what bothers them, they will likely be aware of 
it and seek ways to engage more in relationships with others.  
In conclusion, the laziness and loneliness objections do not seem to form a substantial 
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obstacle against the alleviation of the epistemic problem through basic income. 
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Chapter VI  Implications 
  The last chapter of this thesis will assess the implications from the conclusions drawn 
in this thesis. In short, these conclusions are threefold. First, basic income has positive 
consequences in terms of people’s happiness because it alleviates the epistemic problem: 
people become more reliable at knowing what makes them happy. Second, the laziness 
objection does not form a substantial counter-argument that could prevent the epistemic 
problem to be alleviated. It was shown that it is unlikely that people become lazy on a large 
scale. Third, the loneliness objection does not form a substantial counter-argument that could 
prevent the epistemic to be alleviated. It was likewise shown that it is unlikely that people 
become lonely on a large scale.  
In general, these conclusions have a particular relevance for the basic income debate, 
as well as for the happiness literature. More specifically concerning the basic income debate, 
the thesis provides an additional argument for how basic income has positive consequences 
in terms of people’s happiness. Moreover, it provides some reason to believe that it is 
unlikely that people become lazy or lonely on a large scale with the implementation of basic 
income. The main implication for the happiness literature, specifically concerning Haybron, 
is that this thesis shows that several factors that contribute to us being unreliable at knowing 
what makes us happy, have the potential to be alleviated. This might also have consequences 
for policy approaches concerning happiness. This chapter will divide the implications in two 
sections, one concerning the basic income debate, the second concerning the debate on 
happiness. Still, some overlap between the two debates is possible.  
 
6.1 Implications for the basic income debate  
  The aim of this section is to position the findings from this thesis in the current basic 
income debate. Although this thesis is not directly concerned with the feasibility aspect of 
the basic income debate, it is worthwhile, as will be shown, to point out its relevance. It is 
specifically relevant to compare my claims with those made in the book Free Money for All 
(Walker, 2016). The reason this book is chosen is because it devotes a chapter to the relation 
between basic income and happiness (p. 119-142). In this chapter, Mark Walker considers 
different approaches on the theory of happiness. A cognitive account of happiness in the 
Unconditional Basic Income and the Epistemic Problem of Happiness by Bastiaan Meinders 
 
42 
 
form of a life satisfaction theory is considered together with affective theories of happiness, 
conforming to Haybron’s account of happiness. Walker explains that he does not need to 
decide between one of these approaches because: “both accounts point in the same direction: 
a distribution pattern of income and wealth that is more egalitarian will promote aggregate 
happiness” (Walker, 2016, p. 124). The conclusions that Walker makes heavily draws on the 
examination of a relation between income and happiness: “the argument depends crucially 
on insights gained from social science about the relationship between happiness and income” 
(ibid, p. 131). His approach is utilitarian. On the one hand, he argues that basic income 
promotes an aggregate increase of happiness, mainly because increased equality granted by 
basic income creates a relative greater increase of happiness for the poor compared to rich, 
without a significant decrease in happiness for the rich. On the other hand, Walker raises 
several concerns that show that basic income could also result in unhappiness. For example, 
it is suggested that “dirty jobs” might not be done if people are already provided with a basic 
income, which might result in a decreased aggregate happiness (ibid, p. 138).  
  In short, the chapter considers the potential contributing or diminishing effects of 
happiness by basic income. Walker’s analysis is thorough but does not take the epistemic 
problem of happiness into account. The focus in Walker’s analysis is different from the focus 
in this thesis. Walker explains that there is good reason to believe that basic income 
maximises everybody’s happiness. The focus of this thesis is to argue that basic income 
facilitates living conditions that enable people to overcome some of the epistemic obstacles 
to find happiness. Nonetheless, the thesis that basic income could alleviate the epistemic 
problem and thus result in positive consequences in terms of people’s happiness, would 
provide an additional argument for Walker’s analysis in favour of basic income. Therefore, 
it would contribute to a more balanced assessment of the effect of basic income on happiness.  
 
6.2 Implications for the happiness debate  
  Haybron explains, as shown before, that there are good reasons to believe that many 
people are unreliable at knowing what makes them happy: “[..] there are good reasons for 
doubting that any of us have a firm grasp on the quality of our experience of life, in particular 
its affective character” (Haybron, p. 199). Haybron provides several arguments (of which 
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some were highlighted in this thesis) and examples of why we are unreliable at knowing 
what makes us happy. However, he never touches on the possibility of alleviating the factors 
that contribute to this unreliability. With this thesis, it is illustrated that there is a possibility 
to alleviate at least some of the factors that contribute to this unreliability, therefore using 
Haybron’s work as a way to construct a possibility to become more reliable at knowing what 
makes us happy.   
  However, part of Haybron’s work and the conclusions drawn in this thesis are 
clashing. Recall the earlier mentioned notion of liberal optimism. Haybron defines liberal 
optimism as the assumption that people are reliable at knowing what makes them happy and 
should therefore be granted with authority and freedom to govern their own happiness. This 
would mean that policies should be aimed at granting people this freedom and choice in 
order to govern their happiness. Haybron does not agree with liberal optimism because he 
questions the central assumption: people are reliable at knowing what makes them happy.  
 
  For our purposes it suffices to make the idea just plausible enough that it becomes an open question  
  whether human nature is congenial to the speculations of liberal optimism. And the idea that we  
  are prone systematically to make serious mistakes in the individualized pursuit of happiness should  
  not be regarded as an esoteric possibility, much less an outright fiction. It should be the default  
  view. (Haybron, 2008, p. 249)  
   
Now, basic income could be perceived as an “unbridled expansion of an individual's freedom 
to shape their lives”, because there are no restrictions or obligations tied to basic income. 
Basic income seems to provide people with a financial basis that makes them quite free to 
shape their lives as they wish. To understand how basic income and the conclusions made 
in the thesis relate to liberal optimism, let us review the three assumptions made by liberal 
optimism. The first, “personal authority” (ibid, p. 13), entails that we are well aware of the 
interests that we have. What is good for a person is what he or she wants. Haybron does not 
agree with this assumption because we base our interests on subjective psychological states 
and neglect the more important and longer lasting emotional states. The second assumption, 
“inherent benignity” (ibid, p. 258), claims that the benefits from greater freedom and choice 
outweigh the downsides compared with the benefits. Haybron explains that we should be 
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careful with this assumption, as the downsides of greater freedom should not be 
underestimated. For example, it takes more effort to determine what a good choice is, 
because there is simply more choice. Also, there is the possibility to have more regret with 
greater choice. The third assumption, “benign composition” (ibid, p. 260), claims that an 
individual approach to well-being is, from a collective point of view, benign. The eventual 
benefits in terms of well-being will outweigh the costs in an environment that provides many 
options for individuals to pursue their goals. The underlying thought is that the “invisible 
hand of the market” (ibid, p. 260) will ensure that the benefits will outweigh the costs. 
Haybron does not agree, but he admits that the possibility to shape your life independently 
of others is attractive. However, social ties and ties with our direct environment become 
optional because people will be increasingly independent in managing their well-being under 
the ideology of liberal optimism.   
 
 This is partly the attraction of option freedom: it allows as much as possible for people’s lives to be  
 driven internally rather than by the customs of their communities or the whims of nature. The  
 unbounded society frees us to attain self-fulfillment on our own terms by enabling us to decouple  
 ourselves from the land and society, so that— to the extent possible— the only bonds between  
 these things and ourselves are the bonds we willingly accept. (Haybron, 2008, p. 261)  
 
The promotion of an individual pursuit of well-being is beneficial for the individual but, 
according to Haybron, undermines the benefits for the community. Haybron doubts the three 
assumptions of liberal optimism. The freedom and potential increase of choice provided by 
a basic income are in line with liberal optimism and therefore clashing with Haybron’s 
claims. The findings in this thesis provide a reply to Haybron’s doubts about liberal 
optimism. In other words, this thesis could be a contribution to liberal optimism, offering a 
different perspective compared to Haybron. The following three paragraphs will compare 
the findings of this thesis with the three replies of Haybron to the assumptions of liberal 
optimism.   
 Haybron’s objection to the personal authority assumption is that we base our interests 
and decisions too much on subjective psychological states, compared to the more important 
deeper and longer lasting emotional states. In the thesis, it is argued that a basic income 
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favours an environment that makes us more reliable at recognising longer lasting negative 
emotional states through the alleviation of the epistemic problem. If this is the case and we 
assume that basic income is a policy in line with liberal optimism, then it follows that 
Haybron’s reply to the personal authority assumption does not hold against basic income 
specifically.  
 Haybron’s objection to the inherent benignity assumption is that an increase in choice 
may have negative consequences for happiness. The increase of choice offered by basic 
income might indeed require more work to make informed decisions. However, because the 
epistemic problem is alleviated by basic income, people become more reliable at making 
decisions concerning their happiness. Thus, the increase of choice might require more effort, 
but an eventual longer lasting benefit is likely as well. Therefore, this also illustrates that 
there is less regret after a decision is made, as the decision becomes more reliable. A more 
reliable decision, regardless of an increase in choice, seems to have positive and not negative 
consequences for one’s happiness. Therefore, basic income seems immune to Haybron’s 
criticism of the inherent benignity assumption of liberal optimism.  
 The third and last assumption of liberal optimism is benign composition. Haybron 
explained that the individual pursuit of well-being is not likely to have positive 
consequences, as social and environmental ties are likely to become lost in the focus on 
individual freedom to be able to shape life independent of the environment and others. Also 
this criticism does not seem to apply to basic income, as the thesis showed that basic income 
favours an environment which facilitates meaningful relationships and connection with the 
environment, even if basic income itself does not provide a concrete and public infrastructure 
for social relationships (this was one of Harris’s worries).  
 By explaining how the conclusions drawn in this thesis relate to Haybron’s criticisms 
of the different assumptions of liberal optimism, it is shown that the greater freedom 
provided by basic income is not necessarily subject to Haybron’s criticism.    
In addition, the potential of alleviating the epistemic problem also has consequences 
for happiness related policy advice. For example, in the Oxford Handbook of Well-Being 
and Public Policy (Adler & Fleurbaey, 2016), Haybron describes two approaches to gather 
data about people's well-being: hedonistic and emotional well-being measures. In short, the 
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hedonistic methods to measure well-being focus on recently experienced emotions (e.g., 
enthusiasm, fear, hostility) as well as questionnaires that ask if a certain affect is experienced 
during the day (e.g. Gallup 2008). Emotional well-being measures are found in, for example, 
data about depression and anxiety disorders. These two measures are not perfect as Haybron 
explained in other literature used in this thesis as well: people can be mistaken about their 
current state of being (Haybron, 2016, p. 362). Despite this, such measures are needed for 
policy and therefore require attention for improvement (ibid, p. 363). It is here where the 
findings in this thesis (the potential to alleviate the epistemic problem) can provide a 
contribution as well as a recommendation for future research. Focusing on the improvement 
of measures for well-being and happiness on which new policies could be based upon seems 
to be a good development indeed. However, it might be better in the long term to focus on 
the question of how our reliability of knowing what makes up happy can be helped. When 
the focus is laid on improving the methods of measuring happiness, it implies that these 
improvements in turn could facilitate policy makers in order for them to design better 
policies that would improve the happiness of people. Instead, when we focus on alleviating 
the factors of the epistemic problem, this would provide a basis for the development of 
policies that empower people to shape their life according to their own (reliable) perception 
of happiness, instead of the perception of policy makers. 
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Conclusion 
  This thesis argued how the introduction of basic income will have positive 
consequences in terms of people’s happiness. This is argued for by illustrating how the 
introduction of basic income would reduce the epistemic problem of happiness and provide 
an environment where we are less dominated by materialistic goals. First, two theories of 
happiness were considered and rejected, before adopting Haybron’s account of happiness in 
terms of positive central affective states. Second, the two-fold problem was explained 
through the work of Kasser (2012) and Haybron (2008): a strong focus on materialistic goals 
and the epistemic problem of happiness both account for many people being unhappy. Third, 
it was argued that the introduction of basic income decreases the epistemic problem by 
inhibiting four identified factors that contribute to the epistemic problem of happiness, as 
well as showing how basic income provides a suitable environment for being less distracted 
by materialistic goals. The possibility that people become lazy and lonely when receiving 
basic income is considered, as well as arguments are provided why this potential difficulty 
is not likely to undermine the positive consequences for happiness. Finally, the potential 
implications for the basic income debate and the happiness debate are described. Namely, 
the alleviation of the epistemic problem by basic income provides an additional perspective 
on the relation between basic income and happiness, contributing to a more balanced 
assessment of this relation in favour of basic income. Also, if basic income greatly increases 
freedom, it was shown that through the alleviation of the epistemic problem, Haybron’s 
critique of liberal optimism does not stand against basic income. Conclusively, 
recommendations are made for the development of measuring tools to identify what affects 
our knowledge of happiness.  
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Abstract 
 
Title: Unconditional Basic Income and the Epistemic Problem of Happiness. 
Title in Estonian: Kodanikupalk ja õnnelikkuse episteemiline problem. 
 
In this thesis, it will be argued that the introduction of an unconditional basic income will 
have positive consequences in terms of people’s happiness. The thesis consists of six 
chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the current basic income debate and 
positions this thesis within the debate. The second chapter considers life-satisfaction theories 
and a hedonistic approach before adopting the emotional state theory of happiness. The third 
chapter shows, through the work of Haybron (2008) and Kasser (2002), that many people 
are unhappy because of two factors: the epistemic problem of happiness (we are unreliable 
at knowing what makes us happy) and a strong focus on materialistic goals. Chapter four 
explains how introducing a basic income would help to overcome some of the factors that 
contribute to the epistemic problem of happiness as well as provide an environment that 
makes us less likely to be focused on materialistic goals. In chapter five I argue that the 
possibility for people to become lazy and/or lonely is not likely to undermine the positive 
consequences for happiness resulting from implementing basic income. The sixth chapter 
consists of a discussion of the implications for the basic income debate and the happiness 
debate.        
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Overview of concepts related to happiness   
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